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DOE V. UNOCAL: 
HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ON THEIR 
WATCH 
Armin Rosencranz* 
David Louk** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last twenty-five years, the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA), a little known provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, has 
become a leading tool for pursuing human rights abusers in U.S. 
courts.1  Allowing foreigners to sue in U.S. courts for customary 
international law violations committed abroad, the ATCA seems 
to enable victims of human rights abuses to sue both individuals 
and corporations.2  After an eight year legal battle, the plaintiffs 
in the most notable ATCA case against a corporation, Doe v. 
Unocal, recently settled with Unocal out of court for an 
undisclosed sum just prior to a jury being empanelled in a 
California state case that paralleled the federal ATCA-based 
case.3 
As Unocal advanced through both the federal and state court 
proceedings, the judges upheld the plaintiffs on many of their 
motions.4  Notwithstanding the settlement, the United States 
 
*Armin Rosencranz (A.B., Princeton; J.D., Ph.D., Stanford) is a consulting professor at 
Stanford. 
**David Louk, a Stanford student, took Professor Rosencranz’ 2003 seminar on the Alien 
Tort Claims Act of 1789. 
 1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”).  The Alien Tort Claims Act is also often referred to as the 
Alien Tort Statute.  See, e.g., LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 70-71 
(1996). 
 2 See Terese M. O’Toole, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: An 
Alien Tort Statute Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 72 MINN. L. REV. 829, 839 
(1988). 
 3 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th 
Cir. 2003), district court opinion vacated by 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter 
Unocal III]. 
 4 See Unocal v. Super. Ct., No. S114884, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 3270 (Cal. May 14, 2003); 
Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal I]; Doe v. Unocal, 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding the 
ATCA’s reach has given human rights activists reason to believe 
that, in certain instances, the ATCA grants the federal 
jurisdiction necessary to hold corporations liable for human 
rights offenses that corporations commit or contribute to abroad.5 
II. DOE V. UNOCAL: U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION 
The case of Doe v. Unocal involved the construction of the 
Yadana pipeline in Burma.6  The plaintiffs, villagers from the 
Tenasserim region of Burma, sued Unocal for its complicity in 
human rights atrocities committed by the Burmese government 
and military during the construction of the pipeline.7  The 
plaintiffs claimed that Unocal, through the Burmese military, 
intelligence and/or police forces, used violence and intimidation 
to relocate whole villages, enslave villagers living in the area of 
the pipeline, steal property, and commit assault, rape, torture, 
forced labor, and murder.8 
The plaintiffs’ lawsuit first came before Judge Richard Paez 
of the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California in 1996 (Unocal I).9  In Unocal I, Judge Paez’ role was 
to determine whether the plaintiffs had shown sufficient 
evidence to survive Unocal’s motion to dismiss under Rule 19 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).10  The Unocal I 
lawsuit included Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and 
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as 
 
110 F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Unocal II]; Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932. 
 5 See Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932. 
 6 Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85. 
 7 Id.  Since 1988, the military junta in Burma has promoted the name of the state 
as Myanmar.  Id. at 884. The U.S. continues to refer to the state as Burma.  Although 
referenced as Burma in this document, both names are used throughout the Doe v. Unocal 
lawsuits. 
 8 Id. at 883. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 884.  Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a person is 
a necessary party if: 
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to 
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.  If the person has not been so 
joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.  If the person 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a 
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.  If the joined party 
objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action 
improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
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defendants in the case.11  Due to immunities granted by the 
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act,12 Judge Paez found that 
MOGE and SLORC, entities controlled by the Burmese 
government, were immune from prosecution.13  They were 
dropped as co-defendants in the case.14 
In its motion to dismiss, Unocal argued that under FRCP 
Rule 19, SLORC and MOGE were required parties in the 
lawsuit.15  Judge Paez disagreed: because plaintiffs were 
claiming Unocal was liable as a joint tortfeasor, compensatory 
relief could be accorded, even if SLORC and MOGE were not 
defendants.16  Because plaintiffs were seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief, the case went forward without MOGE or 
SLORC as named defendants.17  Judge Paez’ ruling was 
significant in that it allowed the plaintiffs to seek damages from 
a U.S. corporation, even if it was only one of several named 
responsible parties for a violation of the ATCA.  In addition, he 
recognized that corporations are viable defendants for plaintiffs 
claiming an ATCA violation.18 
III. DOE V. UNOCAL:  U.S. DISTRICT COURT, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Unocal then moved for summary judgment on all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims before U.S. District Judge Ronald Lew.19  In 
arguing for summary judgment, Unocal contended that plaintiffs 
provided no evidence that made their case actionable under the 
 
 11 Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 883. 
 12 28 U.S.C § 1330 (1993).  See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 
1 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a 
foreign state enjoys general immunity from civil actions for damages unless the damages 
occurred in the United States or the matter falls within one of FSIA’s enumerated 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 
488 U.S. 428, 434-39 (1989) (holding that FSIA’s enumerated exceptions provide the only 
mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state and its agencies or 
instrumentalities).  The FSIA is, therefore, often crucial to a plaintiff’s attempt to bring 
not only a U.S. multinational corporation before the court, but also its foreign state 
business partners as well. 
 13 Unocal I, 963 F. Supp. at 887. 
 14 Id. at 888. 
 15 Id. at 889. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 889.  Unlike similar ATCA cases in which the plaintiffs sought 
environmental cleanup or other forms of equitable relief, the Doe plaintiffs sought “an 
order directing defendants to cease payment to SLORC, and an order directing defendants 
to cease their participation in the joint enterprise until the resulting human rights 
violations in the Tenasserim region cease.”  Id. 
 18 Id. at 891. 
 19 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.  Summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists.  Id. at 1303 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).  If the 
moving party can show that there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to 
return a verdict for the non-moving party, the case must be dismissed.  Id. 
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ATCA.20  For the ATCA to grant jurisdiction over a suit, the 
defendant must either be a state actor, linked to state action, or 
have committed one of the “handful” of jus cogens violations.21 
A. Requirement of State Action 
After MOGE and SLORC were removed as defendants, 
Unocal, the remaining defendant, could not reasonably be 
considered a state actor.22  However, plaintiffs sought to prove 
that the Burmese army’s actions were linked to Unocal’s will and 
for Unocal’s benefit.23  To determine whether Unocal’s actions 
could be considered “state action,” Judge Lew used two tests: the 
joint action test,24 and the proximate cause test.25  Because the 
joint action test is only appropriate in instances where the 
private actor is accused of having committed the crime and is 
aided by the state, he found it inapplicable.26 
Instead, Judge Lew used the proximate cause test.  To prove 
proximate cause, a plaintiff must show that a non-state actor 
exercised control over the government’s decision to commit a 
 
 20 Id. at 1303. 
 21 Id. at 1304.  Jus Cogens violations are acts that are so heinous that, when 
committed by any party, state or private, they violate “the law of nations.”  Id. at 1303-04 
(quoting 28 U.S.C § 1350 (1993)).  Violations of the law of nations violate customary 
international law, which governs the actions of both state and non-state actors.  The 
norms of customary international law emerge over time through widespread repetition by 
the practice of states.  Id. at 1304-05. 
 22 Id. at 1306-07. 
 23 Id. at 1303-10. 
 24 Id. at 1305.  The Supreme Court first established the joint action test in Dennis v. 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).  In a unanimous opinion written by Justice White, it noted 
that to act “‘under color of’ state law . . . does not require that the defendant be an officer 
of the State.  It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or 
its agents.”  Id. at 27 (emphasis added).  In Dennis, the defendant bribed a judge to obtain 
an illegally issued injunction.  The judge’s immunity from liability did not change the 
character of his actions or that of his conspirators, who together jointly acted under color 
of law in granting the injunction.  Since the judge had immunity only because his act was 
an official judicial action, the injunction must have been granted under color of law.  Id. at 
24. 
 Since Dennis, courts have varied in their application of the joint action test.  To find 
joint action, some courts require a conspiracy between the two parties.  See Gallagher v. 
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995).  In the case of 
Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991), the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that “[a] requirement of the joint action 
charge . . .  is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.”  
Other courts have simply required a more complicit state role to qualify as joint action.  
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that “[j]oint action . . . 
requires a substantial degree of cooperative action.”  Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 
1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).  Moreover, in Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 
the D.C. Circuit Court determined that “joint activity” requires, “at a minimum, some 
overt and significant state participation in the challenged action.” (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). 
 25 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
 26 Id. at 1306-07. 
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violation.27  The proximate cause test first arose in Arnold v. 
IBM.28  In Arnold, state officials searched the plaintiff’s property 
with a warrant granted because of IBM’s withholding of specific 
information regarding the allegations against him.29  He sued, 
claiming that IBM’s actions were under color of law since IBM 
was part of a conspiracy with state officials.30  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that proving proximate cause 
requires more than action by the state.31  Although it was 
undisputed that IBM was involved in the task force investigating 
Arnold (it would not have existed but for IBM’s actions), no 
evidence indicated that the defendants exerted control over the 
decisions of the task force.32  The court therefore ruled that IBM’s 
involvement with the task force did not proximately cause 
Arnold’s injuries.33  In Brower v. County of Inyo, the court 
specifically stated that for a complaint to sufficiently prove a 
private party acted under color of law, “it must allege that 
specific conduct by a party was a proximate cause” of the act.34 
In considering Unocal’s motion, Judge Lew chose to interpret 
proximate cause as the Ninth Circuit did in King v. Massarweh.35  
There, the court cited Arnold in determining that “absent some 
showing that a private party had some control over state officials’ 
decision” to commit the alleged act, “the private party did not 
proximately cause the injuries stemming from [it].”36  Because 
“[p]laintiffs present[ed] no evidence [alleging that] Unocal 
‘controlled’ the Myanmar military’s decision to commit the 
alleged tortious acts[,]” Judge Lew found that Unocal did not act 
under “color of law” for purposes of the ATCA.37 
In addition, plaintiffs claimed that a tort claim of forced 
labor, an act akin to modern slavery, is actionable under the 
ATCA regardless of whether the actor is a private individual or 
acting under the “color of law.”38  Judge Lew agreed and 
dismissed Unocal’s claims that the forced labor was more akin to 
a public service requirement of limited duration.39 
 
 27 Id. at 1307. 
 28 637 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 29 Id. at 1353. 
 30 Id. at 1354. 
 31 Id. at 1355-56. 
 32 Id. at 1357. 
 33 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d at 1357. 
 34 817 F.2d 540, 547 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
 35 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (citing King v. Masserweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 
(9th Cir. 1986)). 
 36 King, 782 F.2d at 829. 
 37 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1307. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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B. Secondary Liability 
Plaintiffs also had to prove “that Unocal [was] legally 
responsible for the Myanmar [Burmese] military’s forced labor 
practices.”40  Plaintiffs cited decisions during the U.S. Military 
Tribunals after World War II as setting the precedent that the 
knowledge and approval of slave labor practices by an 
industrialist profiting from such actions is sufficient for a finding 
of liability.41  The court disagreed and found that, under 
international law, the vicarious liability of directors requires 
participation and cooperation in the practice of forced labor.42  
Although Judge Lew acknowledged that the evidence pointed to 
Unocal’s knowledge of the forced labor practices, he dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims that Unocal could be held legally responsible for 
the forced labor because none of the plaintiffs’ evidence suggested 
Unocal actively sought to employ forced labor.43 
The plaintiffs thereafter amended their suit.  In Unocal II, 
they invoked the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act 
(RICO), which makes it illegal for organized criminal 
conspiracies to operate legitimate businesses.44  Plaintiffs also 
invoked federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133145 in 
addition to filing under California state law.46  Again, Judge Lew 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.47  He declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims under California state 
law, which, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), he could have done if all 
federal claims are dismissed.48 
Because Judge Lew found that no genuine issue of material 
fact existed, he granted Unocal summary judgment and 
 
 40 Id. at 1309. 
 41 Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 
(The Krupp Case), 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribs. Under 
Control Council Law No. 10 (1950). 
 42 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003).  Unocal believed that RICO could not be used 
to hold corporations liable for acts committed extraterritorially.  Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 
2d at 1310-11.  Judge Lew agreed.  Id.  And because he found plaintiffs’ evidence of 
“substantial acts in furtherance of the Project [that] occurred within the United States,” 
he rejected their claim under RICO.  Id. at 1311. 
 45 28 U.S.C § 1331 (1993).  Plaintiffs argued that the law of nations is incorporated 
into federal common law such that, under the federal question statute, the district court 
would have jurisdiction over a violation of the law of nations.  Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1311.  Judge Lew found that plaintiffs’ claims lacked jurisdiction under the federal 
question statute for the same reasons he found them lacking under the ATCA: plaintiffs 
provided insufficient proof of Unocal’s direct or vicarious liability for the actions of the 
Myanmar military.  Id. 
 46 Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. 
 47 Id. at 1310-12. 
 48 Id. at 1311-12. 
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dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice.49  As the state 
law claims were dismissed without ruling on them, both 
plaintiffs appealed Judge Lew’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit and re-filed the claims in California state 
court.50  At this point, Doe v. Unocal split into two cases: one 
federal and one state. 
IV. DOE V. UNOCAL: UNOCAL’S NINTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT APPEAL 
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit heard the plaintiffs’ appeal of summary judgment 
in favor of Unocal.51  The panel agreed with the lower court’s 
ruling that state agencies MOGE and SLORC were immune from 
prosecution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.52  
However, the court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Unocal and determined that a reasonable 
fact finder could find genuine issues of material fact upon the 
evidence submitted.53  Although all three judges found in favor of 
the plaintiffs, Judge Stephen Reinhardt filed a concurring 
opinion to Judge Harry Pregerson’s majority opinion.54 
The majority disagreed with the lower court’s finding that no 
evidence suggested that Unocal could be held accountable for the 
actions of the Burmese military under the ATCA.55  The majority 
cited Kadic v. Karadžiþ, a Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
ruling in which the court found that certain crimes, such as rape, 
torture and summary execution, while ordinarily requiring state 
action under the ATCA, do not need to be committed under “color 
of law” if done so in the furtherance of other more heinous 
crimes, such as slave trading, genocide, or war crimes.56  These 
crimes, known as jus cogens crimes, do not require state action 
and are so egregious that they violate the law of nations 
regardless of whether they are committed under “color of law.”57 
 
 49 Id. at 1312. 
 50 See Unocal III, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Pl.’s Compl., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 
Nos. BC 237 980 & BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2000), available at 
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/statecomplaint2003.doc (last updated Oct. 15, 2004). 
 51 Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 936. 
 52 Id. at 958. 
 53 Id. at 962. 
 54 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 55 Id. at 947. 
 56 Id. at 945-46 (citing Kadic v. Karadžiþ, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 57 The court in Kadic investigated whether other crimes committed by private 
individuals could be jus cogens violations, under which the ATCA grants jurisdiction.  
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241.  The court looked at three crimes: genocide, war crimes, and 
torture.  Id. at 241-43.  First, it determined that genocide is a crime applicable to private 
non-state actors since the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 criminalizes 
acts of genocide regardless of whether the perpetrator acts under color of law.  Id. at 242 
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The majority also reversed the lower court’s determination 
that the plaintiffs provided insufficient evidence to prove “active 
participation” on the part of Unocal, as was necessary during the 
Nuremberg War Tribunals after World War II.58  The majority 
noted that during the Nuremberg Tribunals, “active 
participation” was only required to overcome the defendants’ 
“necessity defense.”59  Since Unocal did not, and could not, argue 
necessity, plaintiffs did not need to prove “active participation.”60 
The majority agreed to apply international law and 
considered whether a private actor had to act “under color of 
law.”61  Instead of looking solely at the Nuremberg trials, the 
court found the two-pronged “aiding and abetting” test, actus 
reus and mens rea, set by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda instructive.62  For actus reus, the court 
relied on the ICTY’s ruling in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, which 
found that actus reus “requires practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime.”63  The ICTY determined that 
the acts of the accomplice must have had a “substantial [enough] 
effect on the commission of the crime” that it would have been 
unlikely to occur in “the same way [without] someone act[ing] in 
the role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed.64 
 
 
(citing Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1988)).  
Second, considering war crimes, it found that they too granted jurisdiction because of the 
long standing liability of private individuals committing war crimes.  Id. at 242-43.  
Finally, courts have recognized this liability since before World War I and reconfirmed it 
at the Nuremberg Trials after World War II.  Id. at 243. 
 Other courts have supported that a “handful of crimes” violate jus cogens norms.  In 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Edwards supported the notion that although 
most violations of the law of nations require state action for the ATCA to attach liability, 
there are a “handful of crimes” that violate jus cogens norms and are actionable when 
committed by non-state actors.  726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., came to 
the same conclusion, finding that courts have “universal jurisdiction” for such acts as 
genocide, war crimes and terrorism.  969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to disagree when it heard the case on appeal.  See 
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1999).  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, also concluded that 
certain crimes such as murder, genocide and slavery are all violations of jus cogens norms.  
71 F.3d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 58 Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 947-48. 
 59 Id. at 947. 
 60 Id. at 948. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 949-51. 
 63 Id. at 950. 
 64 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 112 I.L.R. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II May 7, 1997)). 
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 For the mens rea, the court also relied upon the ICTY’s 
decision in Furundzija.  The tribunal found that mens rea is 
fulfilled when the accomplice has reasonable knowledge that his 
or her “actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of 
the crime.”65  The tribunal said it was unnecessary for the 
accomplice to know the precise nature of the crimes.66  The 
accomplice need only know that one of a number of crimes would 
likely be committed, and that the abettor would be facilitating 
the commission of that crime.67  The accomplice does not have to 
intend to commit the offense, but only have the knowledge that 
he will be aiding and abetting it.68 
The court determined that a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that Unocal’s conduct could meet the actus reus and the 
mens rea requirements of aiding and abetting the Burmese 
military’s actions.69  Evidence that Unocal provided practical 
assistance to the military in subjecting plaintiffs to forced labor, 
without which the perpetration of forced labor would likely not 
have occurred, was sufficient for actus reus.70  For mens rea, the 
court found genuine issues of material fact regarding Unocal’s 
knowledge that forced labor was being used to the benefit of the 
pipeline’s owners.71 
The court found that there were genuine issues of material 
fact regarding whether Unocal aided and abetted the forced labor 
practices of the Burmese military.72  This holding, combined with 
the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ other claims of rape and 
murder did not need to be committed “under color of law” as long 
as they were committed in furtherance of the forced labor,73 
compelled the Ninth Circuit to overturn the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment for Unocal.74  The Ninth Circuit 
declared that the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence for 
their case to move forward.75 
 
 65 Id. at 951 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 
(1999)). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 952. 
 70 Id. at 952. 
 71 Id. at 953. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 954 (quoting Kadic v. Karadžiþ, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 74 Id. at 962-63 (reversing District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Unocal on plaintiff’s ATCA claims for forced labor, murder, and rape; affirming District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Unocal on plaintiff’s ATCA claims for 
torture). 
 75 Id. at 962-63. 
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A. Concurring Opinion 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt went a step 
further and argued that it was unnecessary to apply 
international criminal law standards of aiding and abetting.76  
Instead, he asserted that “federal common law tort principles, 
such as agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard,” were 
entirely appropriate for ATCA cases.77  For the claims of forced 
labor, Judge Reinhardt found it irrelevant whether forced labor 
was a modern equivalent of slavery, and therefore a jus cogens 
violation.78  Because plaintiffs were alleging that the Burmese 
military committed the forced labor abuses, and that Unocal 
should be held responsible under the theory of third-party 
liability, it was unnecessary for them to prove that the alleged 
abuses were jus cogens violations.79 
Judge Reinhardt also looked more favorably on the plaintiffs’ 
claims of Unocal’s third-party liability.  He determined that their 
alleged complaints of joint venture, agency, and reckless 
disregard are all common third-party liability theories in federal 
common law, so federal common law – not international law – 
should be applied to their claims.80 
Under federal common law, the judge found that, for joint 
venture liability, any member of the joint venture can be liable 
for the torts of its co-venturers.81  Unocal argued that a separate, 
independent corporation, Moattama Gas Transportation Co. 
(MGTC), oversaw construction of the pipeline.82  However, 
plaintiffs provided evidence to the contrary, including a Unocal 
business manager stating that the appearance of two separate 
entities was nothing but an illusion.83  Since the evidence 
suggested that MGTC was part of the joint venture, and not a 
separate corporation as Unocal contended, Judge Reinhardt 
determined that the plaintiffs could proceed to trial on their joint 
venture claim.84 
For the agency liability claim, plaintiffs argued that Unocal 
should be held liable for the Burmese military’s actions because 
the military acted as its agent.85  Judge Reinhardt found 
significant evidence that Unocal asserted control over aspects of 
 
 76 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 964. 
 80 Id. at 971. 
 81 Id. at 970. 
 82 Id. at 971-72. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 972. 
 85 Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 972. 
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the military’s operations in relation to the construction of the 
pipeline.86  Internal documents, memoranda by Unocal 
executives, and public statements that Unocal had control over 
the military all suggested that Unocal had control over aspects of 
the military’s operations.87  This was sufficient evidence for 
Judge Reinhardt to find that the plaintiffs’ claim that Unocal’s 
control over aspects of the Burmese military’s actions, if proven, 
would indicate a relationship of agency.88 
Judge Reinhardt then considered the claim that Unocal was 
liable for reckless disregard of the human rights abuses 
committed by the Myanmar military in performing tasks related 
to the pipeline project.89  Under his interpretation of 
recklessness, proof of acting in conscious disregard to known 
dangers, even without the proof of intent, is all that is necessary 
to be considered reckless disregard.90  Plaintiffs provided 
considerable evidence suggesting that Unocal knew of the likely 
outcome of its involvement with the Myanmar military, including 
meetings with human rights groups in which Unocal was 
informed of the military’s brutal treatment of its people; a risk 
management consulting firm’s report prior to Unocal’s joining the 
project, suggesting that the risk of forced labor abuses in 
connection with the project was high; and testimony from Unocal 
executives acknowledging their concerns before entering into the 
project, in particular the potential for human rights abuses.91  
Judge Reinhardt found the evidence supporting the claim of 
reckless disregard satisfactory for the plaintiffs to move to trial 
with the claim. 
Finally, Judge Reinhardt considered the plaintiffs’ claims of 
 
 86 Id. at 973.  Judge Reinhardt turned to the Supreme Court for guidance in 
developing his agency argument: 
The theory of agency liability is also well-supported in the federal common law.  
The Supreme Court has observed in the context of the Copyright Act that 
“when we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as employee, 
employer, and scope of employment to be understood in light of agency law, we 
have relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of 
any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.” 
Id. at 972 (citation omitted). 
 87 Id. at 973. 
 88 Id. at 974. 
 89 Id. at 974-76. 
 90 Id. at 975.  Judge Reinhardt considered objective recklessness and subjective 
recklessness.  As to objective recklessness, he stated that the “Supreme Court has stated 
that ‘[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty 
to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or 
so obvious that it should be known.’”  Id. at 974 (citation omitted).  Judge Reinhardt then 
considered subjective recklessness, stating that “[t]his doctrine requires actual knowledge 
of a substantial risk which the defendant subsequently disregards.” Id. 
 91 Id. at 976. 
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Unocal’s liability for murder and rape.92  Once again, he agreed 
with the majority that the plaintiffs could bring the claims to 
trial, but disagreed with their reasoning.93  He determined that if 
plaintiffs could prove the acts of murder and rape were 
committed in furtherance of the forced labor program, and if they 
could prove Unocal was liable for the forced labor practices of the 
Burmese military, then it would again be unnecessary for them 
to prove third party liability.94 
V. FEDERAL DOE V. UNOCAL: NINTH CIRCUIT EN BANC ORDER 
After the three-judge panel’s ruling, Doe v. Unocal was ready 
to go to a jury trial. However, on February 14, 2003, the Ninth 
Circuit, upon a vote of the majority of non-recused judges on the 
court, ordered that the case be reheard en banc.95  This order 
vacated the previous three-judge panel ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs and held that the decision cannot be cited as precedent 
in future cases.96  This was as far as the federal Doe v. Unocal 
case went before the December 2004 settlement, although the en 
banc panel was days away from hearing evidence when the 
settlement aborted that process. 
VI. STATE DOE V. UNOCAL: CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT 
A. Phase I 
Because the plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of the 
California Constitution Article I § 6 and violation of the 
California Business and Professions Code § 17200 were never 
considered by the federal district court, plaintiffs re-filed these 
claims in California state court.97  Phase I of the state trial 
focused on “piercing the corporate veil:” Plaintiffs alleged that 
Unocal was the alter ego of the subsidiaries that had contracted 
with the Burmese government.98  The scope of Phase I was 
limited to determining whether there was such a unity of interest 
and ownership between Unocal and its subsidiary that the 
individuality, or separateness between Unocal and its 
 
 92 Id. at 976-77. 
 93 Id. at 977. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 978-79. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Pl.’s Compl., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/statecomplaint2003.doc. 
 98 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7, 
2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/PlaintiffMSARuling.doc (Court order denying 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Adjudication) 
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subsidiaries ceased to exist.99  The question was control: Did 
Unocal have control over its subsidiaries’ actions? Superior Court 
Judge Victoria Chaney found that it did not, and that Unocal’s 
subsidiaries were not sham entities.100 
B. Phase II 
Phase II of the trial discussed liability and damages.101  
Unocal moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
factual findings in Phase I precluded going forward to Phase II 
on the agency, control, joint enterprise and joint venture 
theories.102  In Phase I of the trial, to pierce the corporate veil, 
plaintiffs had to provide evidence to suggest that the parent 
controlled the subsidiary sufficiently to deprive the subsidiary of 
its independent personality.103  The court found that plaintiffs 
did not show this.104  Unocal argued that because the court ruled 
that Unocal did not control its subsidiary, it should not be held 
liable for its subsidiary’s actions.105  The court disagreed: It found 
no reason why a principal cannot be held liable for the 
wrongdoing of its agent, committed in the scope of its agency, 
merely because the agent is a distinct corporation.106  Judge 
Chaney ruled that although the case was bound by the applicable 
factual determinations made in Phase I, the question before the 
court in Phase I was alter ego, not agency or joint venture.107  
Thus, because both the burdens of proof and the claims made in 
each phase of the trial were different, the finding of fact in Phase 
I did not preclude a finding of fact in Phase II.108  Therefore, the 
court found that the finding of fact in Phase I did not 
automatically transfer to Phase II to resolve the issues of agency, 
control, enterprise or joint venture.109  Judge Chaney denied 
 
 99 Id. 
 100 Doe v. Unocal (Oct. 15, 2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml  
(stating that in the first phase of the trial, Judge Chaney concluded that the Unocal 
subsidiaries involved in the Project are not sham entities). 
 101 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (Court order denying 
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3-9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7, 
2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/PlaintiffMSARuling.doc (Court order denying 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication) 
 104 Id. 
 105 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (Court order denying 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment). 
 106 Id. at 4. 
 107 Id. at 6-8. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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Unocal’s motion for summary judgment.110 
VII. DOE V. UNOCAL SETTLEMENT 
After Judge Chaney’s ruling, the next step for the Doe v. 
Unocal state case was to empanel a jury to hear the case. 
However, before this began, Unocal and the plaintiffs reached an 
out-of-court settlement. In a joint-announcement made on 
December 14, 2004, Unocal and EarthRights International, the 
human rights group representing the Burmese plaintiffs, 
announced that they had a reached a settlement that would end 
both the state and federal cases against Unocal.111 
Although EarthRights International declared it was 
“thrilled” and “ecstatic” at the settlement, many questions were 
unanswered regarding the ATCA’s applicability and Unocal’s 
liability.112  Because of the en banc order from the Ninth Circuit, 
the plaintiffs’ earlier victories in the Ninth Circuit cannot be 
used as precedent for future cases.  And because the settlement 
prevents the case from being heard before the full en banc court, 
no ruling will ever be issued on the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
VIII. FUTURE ATCA CASES AGAINST CORPORATIONS 
Although the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel’s rulings are 
not legal precedent, they do suggest that the Alien Tort Claims 
Act is a promising avenue for holding corporations liable for 
international human rights violations.  The Ninth Circuit ruling, 
combined with the California Superior Court’s denial of Unocal’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the vicarious liability claims, 
seems to verify the ATCA’s ability to grant jurisdiction for 
certain torts against U.S. corporations for their actions overseas.  
These two cases were likely to set new precedents as to the 
applicability of the ATCA. 
A. Aiding and Abetting 
The three-judge Ninth Circuit ruling was voided by the en 
banc order, but the ruling suggests that at least some of the 
judges on the Ninth Circuit take an expansive view of the 
jurisdiction granted by the ATCA.  In applying the standards of 
both the ICTY and the Nuremberg Tribunals, the court arrived 
 
 110 Doe v. Unocal, Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 8. 
 111 Jim Lobe, Foreign crimes come home to the US, ASIA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FL16Ae01.html. 
 112 Duncan Campbell, Energy Giant Agrees Settlement with Burmese Villagers, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec.15, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/ 
0,,1373704,00.html. 
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at lenient requirements for aiding and abetting.113  The actus 
reus and mens rea tests are less restrictive than other tests used 
in federal courts (such as the joint action and proximate cause 
tests), though they are commonly used in international courts.114 
B. Judge Reinhardt’s Concurring Opinion 
More promising for future plaintiffs was Judge Reinhardt’s 
concurring opinion in the Ninth Circuit’s overruling of the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment.  Judge Reinhardt 
found that plaintiffs did not need to produce international law 
tests of liability to hold Unocal accountable.115  In using the 
federal common law theories of joint venture liability, agency 
liability, and reckless disregard liability, Reinhardt created more 
viable ways for future plaintiffs to pursue corporations under the 
ATCA.116  Even more promising is that he found the Burmese 
plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence for all three theories of 
liability.117 
Judge Reinhardt’s concurring opinion on the plaintiffs’ 
burden to prove liability for violations that are not jus cogens 
crimes is also more lenient.  Reinhardt concluded that plaintiffs’ 
third party liability claims against Unocal do not need to be jus 
cogens violations themselves, since they are actionable under 
federal common law.118  It remains to be seen whether future 
courts will agree with Judge Reinhardt’s reasoning. 
C. Vicarious Liability 
In the state case, the California Superior Court rejected 
Unocal’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Phase II.119 Judge 
Chaney’s finding that under California law a principal can be 
held liable for the acts of its agent, committed in the scope of its 
agency, gives future plaintiffs firmer ground for holding 
corporations liable for their subsidiaries’ and joint venturers’ 
actions.120  Going forward, corporations will have a stronger 
burden to prove that they should not be held liable in any way for 
their subsidiaries’ actions, even if they do not control the entire 
subsidiary. 
 
 113 See Unocal III, 395 F.3d at 949-53. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 976. 
 118 Id. at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 119 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 
2004), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/doevunocal09142004.pdf (denying Unocal’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
 120 Id. at 6. 
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D. California Business and Professions Code § 17200 
Judge Chaney’s rulings in the California state case also 
suggested that the Doe v. Unocal plaintiffs could have shown, in 
Phase II of the trial, that Unocal was unjustly enriched by the 
human rights abuses of its pipeline project, and that its 
involvement with the Burmese military amounted to an unfair 
business practice under the California Business and Professions 
Code § 17200.121 
E. Indispensable Parties 
By setting aside Unocal’s argument that Burmese entities 
were indispensable parties in both the state and federal cases, 
the courts signaled to plaintiffs that corporations can be held 
liable as third-party actors for violations committed overseas, 
even if U.S. courts have no jurisdiction over the foreign party 
committing the violations.122  Given the close relationships 
between many corporations and foreign regimes in constructing 
and operating projects that result in human rights abuses, this 
ruling bolsters plaintiffs’ ability to pursue corporations for their 
knowing participation in violating customary international law. 
IX. SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE ATCA: SOSA V. ALVAREZ-
MACHAIN (2004) 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed 
questions relating to whether, and under what circumstances, 
the ATCA creates a cause of action for plaintiffs to sue 
corporations for violations of customary international law, it did 
recently rule on the ATCA generally.  In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 
the Court unanimously indicated that the ATCA creates a cause 
of action in a “modest” number of cases involving clear 
international law violations.123  Because it did not go into specific 
causes of action, the Court did not settle the ongoing matter of 
what claims, if any, are actionable under the ATCA.  Harold Koh, 
Dean of Yale Law School, and an expert on international law, 
suggested that the ATCA probably still creates a cause of action 
 
 121 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980, BC 237 679, at 13-16 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 
7, 2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/TortLiabilityMSARuling.doc (granting 
Unocal’s Motions For Summary Adjudication as to the intentional torts and negligence 
causes of action, but denying Unocal’s motion as to the California Business and 
Professions Code § 17200). 
 122 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 889 (C.D. Cal. 1997); NCGUB v. 
Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 358 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 
980, BC 237 679, at 14-15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 7, 2002), at http://www.earthrights.org/ 
unocal/VicariousLiabilityMSARuling.doc (denying Unocal Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment Based on Absence of Vicarious Liability). 
 123 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2744 (2004). 
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for torture, genocide, slavery, apartheid, and other widespread 
and commonly accepted violations.124 
It is unclear from Sosa whether corporations that “aid and 
abet” repressive foreign governments with whom they do 
business may be held liable under the ATCA.  Outside of clearly 
actionable causes, the Court’s ruling did not clarify just how 
much discretion federal court judges have to find causes of action 
under the ATCA.  A 6-to-3 majority seemed to leave it up to 
federal judges to decide (a) which international standards apply 
in a case, and (b) whether the conduct in question violates those 
standards under the ATCA.125  However, in his concurring 
opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the federal judiciary “is 
neither authorized nor suited to” make decisions on which 
international law standards to apply and when certain conduct 
violates them.126  In response to this, Justice Souter, joined by 
Justices Stevens, O’Conner, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
suggested that as long as independent judicial recognition of 
actionable international norms is conducted vigilantly, federal 
judges may still have some discretion over finding causes of 
action in customary international law.127  Thus, at least for now, 
a narrow range of cases involving violations of jus cogens norms 
are actionable under the ATCA, and federal judges may continue 
to use limited discretion in adjudicating such cases. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Both the state and the federal Doe v. Unocal cases were on 
the verge of setting major new precedents for the liability of 
American corporations for human rights abuses committed 
abroad in which they aided and abetted or from which they 
benefited.  Although many of the plaintiffs’ arguments were 
rejected, substantial portions of their case withstood multiple 
motions for summary judgment by Unocal.  Undoubtedly, Unocal 
had cause for alarm. The Doe v. Unocal case also must have 
frightened the Justice Department, as it filed amici curiae briefs 
on Unocal’s behalf throughout the lawsuit.128  As one journalist 
observed, “Unocal . . . probably calculated that the bad publicity 
they would face in a trial is worse than the high cost of settling 
the claim.”129 
 
 124 Warren Richey, Ruling Makes It Harder for Foreigners to Sue in US Courts, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jun. 30, 2004, at 3. 
 125 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-70. 
 126 Id. at 2769-70 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 127 Id. at 2764. 
 128 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae United States, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 
2739 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
 129 Campbell, supra note 112. 
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The suggestions of aiding and abetting, vicarious liability, 
and unjust enrichment seemed ripe for adjudication.  It was quite 
probably a sound business decision on Unocal’s part to settle both 
cases before risking the establishment of such powerful 
precedents.  In view of the federal judges’ various rulings in the 
Doe v. Unocal lawsuit, future plaintiffs seem on firm ground for 
pursuing corporations in federal court under the ATCA for their 
human rights abuses committed abroad.  Such plaintiffs may 
have even greater success pursuing comparable state claims 
based on state constitutional and statutory provisions forbidding 
forced labor, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. 
 
